Yakub v Burgas District Prosecutors Office (Bulgaria) [2026] EWHC 329 (Admin)

The case concerned the Appellant, a Bulgarian national who lived and worked in the UK. In 2019 he had been convicted in Bulgaria of “driving a car following the use of narcotic substances”, an offence contrary to Article 343b of the Bulgarian criminal code. He was stopped by police, seemingly at random. Once police spoke to him, they considered he looked nervous and had red eyes, so they ran a background check on him, and saw a previous condition for drugs driving. They carried out a roadside test, which read positive for methamphetamine. He was given the opportunity to take a blood test, but refused. He was subsequently convicted of an offence under Article 343b. At the time and since, he claimed that he had consumed drugs multiple days prior, and that they must still be in his system, but he was convicted nevertheless.

Anna Rubbi - Guernica 37 Chambers Member

Following an earlier case, Minchev v Bulgaria [2019] EWHC 1925 (Admin), the District Judge at first instance had found that the conduct test for dual criminality under s. 65 of the Extradition Act 2003 was satisfied by the Appellant’s failure to provide a specimen. The Court considered that failing to provide a specimen is an offence under s. 7 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and so, regardless of the fact that that was seemingly not strictly what the Appellant was convicted of in Bulgaria, his offending conduct would still be an offence in England and Wales.

On appeal two arguments were made. First, it was argued that the “conduct” which should be judged for the purposes of the transposition exercise should be limited to only conduct for which the Appellant was actually convicted (namely driving after having taken narcotics), not any conduct which was contextual or narrative (namely the failure to provide a specimen). Second, it was argued that even if the failure to provide a specimen was taken into account, it was incorrect to consider that England and Wales and Bulgaria has similar “fallback positions” for the reason that in England and Wales a conviction would not be inevitable. The Appellant may have elected to give a blood specimen because it may actually have absolved him (as there are minimum limits for methamphetamine in England and Wales following the Drug Driving (Specified Limits) (England and Wales) Regulations 2014, which there seemed not to be in Bulgaria). The JA on the other hand, made reference to an Ordinance which was relied upon in Minchev which set out the process for drugs driving cases, including the step of asking for a blood sample; the JA argued that this showed that the refusal was relevant “conduct” for the purposes of the transposition exercise. This particular Ordinance had not been relied upon by the JA in the Arrest Warrant or further information in this case (but there was reference to a more recent Ordinance without its contents).

Mr. Justice Bourne found for the Appellant. The Court noted at paragraph 23 that this Arrest Warrant “did not refer to any consequence of a person refusing to give a specimen”. Mr Justice Bourne then observed at paragraph 28 “I suspect that finding equivalence between driving after using drugs and failing to provide a specimen is close to the outer boundary of that principle [of necessary equivalence]”.The Court put weight at paragraph 28 on the fact that in England and Wales, the s. 7 offence of failing to provide a specimen is caveated in that it allows an individual to provide a “reasonable excuse” for that failure which would absolve them of a crime under that provision. It found that dual criminality had not been made out.

Mr. Justice Bourne went on to accept the second ground of appeal, that the Arrest Warrant was defective, contrary to s. 2 of the Extradition Act 2003. At paragraph 38, he held:

In this case the warrant is silent as to the legal status of the request for a specimen or the consequence of refusal or the presence or absence of any excuse for refusal. Although an absence of reasonable excuse could be inferred from the information provided, I do not consider that it must be. I therefore conclude that an element of the English offence is missing. (Emphasis in original)

The appeal was allowed, and pursuant to s. 27(5) of the Extradition Act 2003, the extradition order was quashed, and the Appellant was discharged.